{ "schemaVersion": "1.0", "item": { "slug": "agent-card-signing-auditor", "name": "agent-card-signing-auditor", "source": "tencent", "type": "skill", "category": "AI 智能", "sourceUrl": "https://clawhub.ai/andyxinweiminicloud/agent-card-signing-auditor", "canonicalUrl": "https://clawhub.ai/andyxinweiminicloud/agent-card-signing-auditor", "targetPlatform": "OpenClaw" }, "install": { "downloadMode": "redirect", "downloadUrl": "/downloads/agent-card-signing-auditor", "sourceDownloadUrl": "https://wry-manatee-359.convex.site/api/v1/download?slug=agent-card-signing-auditor", "sourcePlatform": "tencent", "targetPlatform": "OpenClaw", "installMethod": "Manual import", "extraction": "Extract archive", "prerequisites": [ "OpenClaw" ], "packageFormat": "ZIP package", "includedAssets": [ "SKILL.md" ], "primaryDoc": "SKILL.md", "quickSetup": [ "Download the package from Yavira.", "Extract the archive and review SKILL.md first.", "Import or place the package into your OpenClaw setup." ], "agentAssist": { "summary": "Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.", "steps": [ "Download the package from Yavira.", "Extract it into a folder your agent can access.", "Paste one of the prompts below and point your agent at the extracted folder." ], "prompts": [ { "label": "New install", "body": "I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete." }, { "label": "Upgrade existing", "body": "I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run." } ] }, "sourceHealth": { "source": "tencent", "status": "healthy", "reason": "direct_download_ok", "recommendedAction": "download", "checkedAt": "2026-04-30T16:55:25.780Z", "expiresAt": "2026-05-07T16:55:25.780Z", "httpStatus": 200, "finalUrl": "https://wry-manatee-359.convex.site/api/v1/download?slug=network", "contentType": "application/zip", "probeMethod": "head", "details": { "probeUrl": "https://wry-manatee-359.convex.site/api/v1/download?slug=network", "contentDisposition": "attachment; filename=\"network-1.0.0.zip\"", "redirectLocation": null, "bodySnippet": null }, "scope": "source", "summary": "Source download looks usable.", "detail": "Yavira can redirect you to the upstream package for this source.", "primaryActionLabel": "Download for OpenClaw", "primaryActionHref": "/downloads/agent-card-signing-auditor" }, "validation": { "installChecklist": [ "Use the Yavira download entry.", "Review SKILL.md after the package is downloaded.", "Confirm the extracted package contains the expected setup assets." ], "postInstallChecks": [ "Confirm the extracted package includes the expected docs or setup files.", "Validate the skill or prompts are available in your target agent workspace.", "Capture any manual follow-up steps the agent could not complete." ] }, "downloadPageUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/downloads/agent-card-signing-auditor", "agentPageUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent", "manifestUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent.json", "briefUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent.md" }, "agentAssist": { "summary": "Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.", "steps": [ "Download the package from Yavira.", "Extract it into a folder your agent can access.", "Paste one of the prompts below and point your agent at the extracted folder." ], "prompts": [ { "label": "New install", "body": "I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete." }, { "label": "Upgrade existing", "body": "I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run." } ] }, "documentation": { "source": "clawhub", "primaryDoc": "SKILL.md", "sections": [ { "title": "A2A Says Signing Is Optional. That's the Problem.", "body": "Helps identify gaps in Agent Card signing that allow impersonation, identity spoofing, and unverifiable capability claims in agent-to-agent trust handshakes." }, { "title": "Problem", "body": "The A2A Protocol specifies Agent Cards as the primary mechanism for agent identity and capability advertisement. An Agent Card tells other agents: who you are, what you can do, and what trust level you claim. But the A2A spec makes signing optional — \"recommended but not required.\" In an ecosystem where 15-18% of published skills are already confirmed malicious, optional signing means any agent can present any identity and any capability claim with zero verifiable proof. The trust handshake that underpins all A2A interactions is built on a foundation that most implementations don't verify." }, { "title": "What This Checks", "body": "This auditor examines Agent Card signing practices across five dimensions:\n\nSignature presence — Does the Agent Card include a signature field? Many implementations omit it entirely, relying on the marketplace's account verification as a trust proxy. That's a single point of failure — marketplace accounts can be compromised or impersonated\nSigning scheme strength — If a signature is present, which algorithm was used? RSA-1024 and ECDSA with weak curves are no longer adequate for high-stakes agent interactions. Checks against current recommendations (Ed25519, RSA-2048+ with PSS padding)\nKey transparency — Is the signing key published in a verifiable key transparency log or JWKS endpoint? A signature is only as trustworthy as the process by which you obtained the public key to verify it\nRevocation mechanism — Does the signing infrastructure include a revocation path? Signing keys get compromised. An Agent Card signed with a compromised key looks identical to a legitimately-signed one without revocation checking\nRotation audit trail — Has the signing key changed? When? With what announcement? Key rotation events that coincide with capability changes or that happen without public announcement are higher-risk than routine scheduled rotations" }, { "title": "How to Use", "body": "Input: Provide one of:\n\nAn Agent Card JSON object to audit directly\nAn agent endpoint URL to fetch and audit the Agent Card\nA set of Agent Card snapshots to compare for rotation events\n\nOutput: A signing audit report containing:\n\nSignature presence and scheme assessment\nKey transparency verification result\nRevocation mechanism check\nRotation history (if available)\nRisk rating: STRONG / ADEQUATE / WEAK / UNSIGNED\nSpecific recommendations for remediation" }, { "title": "Example", "body": "Input: Audit Agent Card for data-processing-agent.example\n\n🪪 AGENT CARD SIGNING AUDIT\n\nAgent: data-processing-agent.example\nCard version: 2.1.0\nAudit timestamp: 2025-03-15T10:30:00Z\n\nSignature presence: ⚠️ ABSENT\n Agent Card contains no signature field\n Identity claim is unverifiable — relies entirely on marketplace account trust\n Risk: any agent can claim this identity or capabilities without detection\n\nSigning scheme: N/A (unsigned)\n\nKey transparency: ✗ NOT CONFIGURED\n No JWKS endpoint referenced in Agent Card\n No key transparency log entry found\n\nRevocation mechanism: ✗ NONE\n No revocation endpoint specified\n No CRL or OCSP equivalent configured\n\nRotation history: N/A\n\nRisk rating: UNSIGNED\n This Agent Card makes identity and capability claims that cannot be\n cryptographically verified. In a trust-sensitive interaction, treat\n all capability claims as unverified assertions.\n\nRecommended actions:\n 1. Implement Ed25519 signing for Agent Card with JWKS endpoint\n 2. Register signing key in a public key transparency log\n 3. Add revocation endpoint to Agent Card metadata\n 4. Establish rotation policy with public announcement process" }, { "title": "Related Tools", "body": "publisher-identity-verifier — Audits publisher identity at the marketplace level; signing auditor checks the A2A protocol layer\ntrust-decay-monitor — Tracks trust freshness over time; signing provides the baseline trust claim that decays\nprotocol-doc-auditor — Checks documentation trust signals; Agent Card signing is the machine-readable equivalent\nattestation-chain-auditor — Validates the full trust chain from signing key to capability claim" }, { "title": "Limitations", "body": "This auditor evaluates signing practices based on publicly observable Agent Card metadata. It cannot assess the security of key storage practices on the agent's host system, verify that the private key holder is actually the claimed agent, or detect signing key compromise that has not yet been publicly disclosed. A well-formed signed Agent Card with strong cryptography can still represent a compromised or malicious agent — signing establishes identity, not trustworthiness. Use in combination with behavioral analysis tools for comprehensive trust assessment." } ], "body": "A2A Says Signing Is Optional. That's the Problem.\n\nHelps identify gaps in Agent Card signing that allow impersonation, identity spoofing, and unverifiable capability claims in agent-to-agent trust handshakes.\n\nProblem\n\nThe A2A Protocol specifies Agent Cards as the primary mechanism for agent identity and capability advertisement. An Agent Card tells other agents: who you are, what you can do, and what trust level you claim. But the A2A spec makes signing optional — \"recommended but not required.\" In an ecosystem where 15-18% of published skills are already confirmed malicious, optional signing means any agent can present any identity and any capability claim with zero verifiable proof. The trust handshake that underpins all A2A interactions is built on a foundation that most implementations don't verify.\n\nWhat This Checks\n\nThis auditor examines Agent Card signing practices across five dimensions:\n\nSignature presence — Does the Agent Card include a signature field? Many implementations omit it entirely, relying on the marketplace's account verification as a trust proxy. That's a single point of failure — marketplace accounts can be compromised or impersonated\nSigning scheme strength — If a signature is present, which algorithm was used? RSA-1024 and ECDSA with weak curves are no longer adequate for high-stakes agent interactions. Checks against current recommendations (Ed25519, RSA-2048+ with PSS padding)\nKey transparency — Is the signing key published in a verifiable key transparency log or JWKS endpoint? A signature is only as trustworthy as the process by which you obtained the public key to verify it\nRevocation mechanism — Does the signing infrastructure include a revocation path? Signing keys get compromised. An Agent Card signed with a compromised key looks identical to a legitimately-signed one without revocation checking\nRotation audit trail — Has the signing key changed? When? With what announcement? Key rotation events that coincide with capability changes or that happen without public announcement are higher-risk than routine scheduled rotations\nHow to Use\n\nInput: Provide one of:\n\nAn Agent Card JSON object to audit directly\nAn agent endpoint URL to fetch and audit the Agent Card\nA set of Agent Card snapshots to compare for rotation events\n\nOutput: A signing audit report containing:\n\nSignature presence and scheme assessment\nKey transparency verification result\nRevocation mechanism check\nRotation history (if available)\nRisk rating: STRONG / ADEQUATE / WEAK / UNSIGNED\nSpecific recommendations for remediation\nExample\n\nInput: Audit Agent Card for data-processing-agent.example\n\n🪪 AGENT CARD SIGNING AUDIT\n\nAgent: data-processing-agent.example\nCard version: 2.1.0\nAudit timestamp: 2025-03-15T10:30:00Z\n\nSignature presence: ⚠️ ABSENT\n Agent Card contains no signature field\n Identity claim is unverifiable — relies entirely on marketplace account trust\n Risk: any agent can claim this identity or capabilities without detection\n\nSigning scheme: N/A (unsigned)\n\nKey transparency: ✗ NOT CONFIGURED\n No JWKS endpoint referenced in Agent Card\n No key transparency log entry found\n\nRevocation mechanism: ✗ NONE\n No revocation endpoint specified\n No CRL or OCSP equivalent configured\n\nRotation history: N/A\n\nRisk rating: UNSIGNED\n This Agent Card makes identity and capability claims that cannot be\n cryptographically verified. In a trust-sensitive interaction, treat\n all capability claims as unverified assertions.\n\nRecommended actions:\n 1. Implement Ed25519 signing for Agent Card with JWKS endpoint\n 2. Register signing key in a public key transparency log\n 3. Add revocation endpoint to Agent Card metadata\n 4. Establish rotation policy with public announcement process\n\nRelated Tools\npublisher-identity-verifier — Audits publisher identity at the marketplace level; signing auditor checks the A2A protocol layer\ntrust-decay-monitor — Tracks trust freshness over time; signing provides the baseline trust claim that decays\nprotocol-doc-auditor — Checks documentation trust signals; Agent Card signing is the machine-readable equivalent\nattestation-chain-auditor — Validates the full trust chain from signing key to capability claim\nLimitations\n\nThis auditor evaluates signing practices based on publicly observable Agent Card metadata. It cannot assess the security of key storage practices on the agent's host system, verify that the private key holder is actually the claimed agent, or detect signing key compromise that has not yet been publicly disclosed. A well-formed signed Agent Card with strong cryptography can still represent a compromised or malicious agent — signing establishes identity, not trustworthiness. Use in combination with behavioral analysis tools for comprehensive trust assessment." }, "trust": { "sourceLabel": "tencent", "provenanceUrl": "https://clawhub.ai/andyxinweiminicloud/agent-card-signing-auditor", "publisherUrl": "https://clawhub.ai/andyxinweiminicloud/agent-card-signing-auditor", "owner": "andyxinweiminicloud", "version": "1.0.0", "license": null, "verificationStatus": "Indexed source record" }, "links": { "detailUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor", "downloadUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/downloads/agent-card-signing-auditor", "agentUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent", "manifestUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent.json", "briefUrl": "https://openagent3.xyz/skills/agent-card-signing-auditor/agent.md" } }