Requirements
- Target platform
- OpenClaw
- Install method
- Manual import
- Extraction
- Extract archive
- Prerequisites
- OpenClaw
- Primary doc
- SKILL.md
Output sanitization for agent responses - prevents accidental secret leaks
Output sanitization for agent responses - prevents accidental secret leaks
Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.
I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Then review README.md for any prerequisites, environment setup, or post-install checks. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete.
I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Then review README.md for any prerequisites, environment setup, or post-install checks. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run.
Output sanitization for agent responses. Scans ALL outbound messages for leaked secrets, tokens, keys, passwords, and PII before they leave the agent. โ ๏ธ This is NOT an input scanner โ clawdefender already handles that. This is an OUTPUT filter for catching things your agent accidentally includes in its own responses.
Agents have access to sensitive data: 1Password vaults, environment variables, config files, wallet keys. Sometimes they accidentally include these in responses when: Debugging and showing full command output Copying file contents that contain secrets Generating code examples with real credentials Summarizing logs that include tokens Arc-shield catches these leaks before they reach Discord, Signal, X, or any external channel.
API Keys & Tokens: 1Password (ops_*), GitHub (ghp_*), OpenAI (sk-*), Stripe, AWS, Bearer tokens Passwords: Assignments like password=... or passwd: ... Private Keys: Ethereum (0x + 64 hex), SSH keys, PGP blocks Wallet Mnemonics: 12/24 word recovery phrases PII: Social Security Numbers, credit card numbers Platform Tokens: Slack, Telegram, Discord
High-entropy strings: Shannon entropy > 4.5 for strings > 16 chars (catches novel secret patterns) Credit cards: 16-digit card numbers Base64 credentials: Long base64 strings that look like tokens
Secret file paths: ~/.secrets/*, paths containing "password", "token", "key" Environment variables: ENV_VAR=secret_value exports Database URLs: Connection strings with credentials
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills git clone <arc-shield-repo> arc-shield chmod +x arc-shield/scripts/*.sh arc-shield/scripts/*.py Or download as a skill bundle.
# Scan agent output before sending agent-response.txt | arc-shield.sh # Block if critical secrets found (use before external messaging) echo "Message text" | arc-shield.sh --strict || echo "BLOCKED" # Redact secrets and return sanitized text cat response.txt | arc-shield.sh --redact # Full report arc-shield.sh --report < conversation.log # Python version with entropy detection cat message.txt | output-guard.py --strict
Pre-send hook (recommended) Add to your messaging skill or wrapper: #!/bin/bash # send-message.sh wrapper MESSAGE="$1" CHANNEL="$2" # Sanitize output SANITIZED=$(echo "$MESSAGE" | arc-shield.sh --strict --redact) EXIT_CODE=$? if [[ $EXIT_CODE -eq 1 ]]; then echo "ERROR: Message contains critical secrets and was blocked." >&2 exit 1 fi # Send sanitized message openclaw message send --channel "$CHANNEL" "$SANITIZED" Manual pipe Before any external message: # Generate response RESPONSE=$(agent-generate-response) # Sanitize CLEAN=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | arc-shield.sh --redact) # Send signal send "$CLEAN"
cd skills/arc-shield/tests ./run-tests.sh Includes test cases for: Real leaked patterns (1Password tokens, Instagram passwords, wallet mnemonics) False positive prevention (normal URLs, email addresses, file paths) Redaction accuracy Strict mode blocking
Patterns are defined in config/patterns.conf: CRITICAL|GitHub PAT|ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,} CRITICAL|OpenAI Key|sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,} WARN|Secret Path|~\/\.secrets\/[^\s]* Edit to add custom patterns or adjust severity levels.
ModeBehaviorExit CodeUse CaseDefaultPass through + warnings to stderr0Development, logging--strictBlock on CRITICAL findings1 if criticalProduction outbound messages--redactReplace secrets with [REDACTED:TYPE]0Safe logging, auditing--reportAnalysis only, no pass-through0Auditing conversations
The Python version (output-guard.py) includes Shannon entropy analysis to catch secrets that don't match regex patterns: # Detects high-entropy strings like: kJ8nM2pQ5rT9vWxY3zA6bC4dE7fG1hI0 # Novel API key format Zm9vOmJhcg== # Base64 credentials Threshold: 4.5 bits (configurable with --entropy-threshold)
Bash version: ~10ms for typical message (< 1KB) Python version: ~50ms with entropy analysis Zero external dependencies: bash + Python stdlib only Fast enough to run on every outbound message without noticeable delay.
From our own agent sessions: # 1Password token "ops_eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..." # Instagram password in debug output "instagram login: user@example.com / MyInsT@Gr4mP4ss!" # Wallet mnemonic in file listing "cat ~/.secrets/wallet-recovery-phrase.txt abandon ability able about above absent absorb abstract..." # GitHub PAT in git config "[remote "origin"] url = https://ghp_abc123:@github.com/user/repo" All blocked by arc-shield before reaching external channels.
Always use --strict for external messages (Discord, Signal, X, email) Use --redact for logs you want to review later Run tests after adding custom patterns to check for false positives Pipe through both bash and Python versions for maximum coverage: message | arc-shield.sh --strict | output-guard.py --strict Don't rely on this alone โ educate your agent to avoid including secrets in the first place (see AGENTS.md output sanitization directive)
Context-free: Can't distinguish between "here's my password: X" (bad) and "set your password to X" (instruction) No semantic understanding: Won't catch "my token is in the previous message" Pattern-based: New secret formats require pattern updates Use in combination with agent instructions and careful prompt engineering.
Full OpenClaw agent integration: # In your agent's message wrapper send_external_message() { local message="$1" local channel="$2" # Pre-flight sanitization if ! echo "$message" | arc-shield.sh --strict > /dev/null 2>&1; then echo "ERROR: Message blocked by arc-shield (contains secrets)" >&2 return 1 fi # Double-check with entropy detection if ! echo "$message" | output-guard.py --strict > /dev/null 2>&1; then echo "ERROR: High-entropy secret detected" >&2 return 1 fi # Safe to send openclaw message send --channel "$channel" "$message" }
False positives on normal text: Adjust entropy threshold: output-guard.py --entropy-threshold 5.0 Edit config/patterns.conf to refine regex patterns Add exceptions to the pattern file Secrets not detected: Check pattern file for coverage Run with --report to see what's being scanned Test with tests/run-tests.sh using your sample Consider lowering entropy threshold (but watch for false positives) Performance issues: Use bash version only (skip entropy detection) Limit input size with head -c 10000 Run in background: arc-shield.sh --report &
Add new patterns to config/patterns.conf following the format: SEVERITY|Category Name|regex_pattern Test with tests/run-tests.sh before deploying.
MIT โ use freely, protect your secrets. Remember: Arc-shield is your safety net, not your strategy. Train your agent to never include secrets in responses. This tool catches mistakes, not malice.
Identity, auth, scanning, governance, audit, and operational guardrails.
Largest current source with strong distribution and engagement signals.