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Openclaw Plugin

Inference-based intrusion detection for AI agents. Pattern matching + LLM analysis for jailbreaks, prompt injection, credential theft, social engineering. 108 detection patterns, OpenClaw plugin, auto-scan, quarantine. Commands: hopeid scan, hopeid test, hopeid setup, hopeid stats, hopeid doctor.

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Inference-based intrusion detection for AI agents. Pattern matching + LLM analysis for jailbreaks, prompt injection, credential theft, social engineering. 108 detection patterns, OpenClaw plugin, auto-scan, quarantine. Commands: hopeid scan, hopeid test, hopeid setup, hopeid stats, hopeid doctor.

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Install for OpenClaw

Quick setup
  1. Download the package from Yavira.
  2. Extract the archive and review SKILL.md first.
  3. Import or place the package into your OpenClaw setup.

Requirements

Target platform
OpenClaw
Install method
Manual import
Extraction
Extract archive
Prerequisites
OpenClaw
Primary doc
SKILL.md

Package facts

Download mode
Yavira redirect
Package format
ZIP package
Source platform
Tencent SkillHub
What's included
SKILL.md, index.ts, openclaw.plugin.json, package.json

Validation

  • Use the Yavira download entry.
  • Review SKILL.md after the package is downloaded.
  • Confirm the extracted package contains the expected setup assets.

Install with your agent

Agent handoff

Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.

  1. Download the package from Yavira.
  2. Extract it into a folder your agent can access.
  3. Paste one of the prompts below and point your agent at the extracted folder.
New install

I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete.

Upgrade existing

I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run.

Trust & source

Release facts

Source
Tencent SkillHub
Verification
Indexed source record
Version
1.3.2

Documentation

ClawHub primary doc Primary doc: SKILL.md 18 sections Open source page

hopeIDS Security Skill

Inference-based intrusion detection for AI agents with quarantine and human-in-the-loop.

Security Invariants

These are non-negotiable design principles: Block = full abort β€” Blocked messages never reach jasper-recall or the agent Metadata only β€” No raw malicious content is ever stored Approve β‰  re-inject β€” Approval changes future behavior, doesn't resurrect messages Alerts are programmatic β€” Telegram alerts built from metadata, no LLM involved

Features

Auto-scan β€” Scan messages before agent processing Quarantine β€” Block threats with metadata-only storage Human-in-the-loop β€” Telegram alerts for review Per-agent config β€” Different thresholds for different agents Commands β€” /approve, /reject, /trust, /quarantine

The Pipeline

Message arrives ↓ hopeIDS.autoScan() ↓ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚ risk >= threshold? β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ BLOCK (strictMode): β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Create QuarantineRecord β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Send Telegram alert β”‚ β”‚ β†’ ABORT (no recall, no agent) β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ WARN (non-strict): β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Inject <security-alert> β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Continue to jasper-recall β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Continue to agent β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ β”‚ ALLOW: β”‚ β”‚ β†’ Continue normally β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜

Configuration

{ "plugins": { "entries": { "hopeids": { "enabled": true, "config": { "autoScan": true, "defaultRiskThreshold": 0.7, "strictMode": false, "telegramAlerts": true, "agents": { "moltbook-scanner": { "strictMode": true, "riskThreshold": 0.7 }, "main": { "strictMode": false, "riskThreshold": 0.8 } } } } } } }

Options

OptionTypeDefaultDescriptionautoScanbooleanfalseAuto-scan every messagestrictModebooleanfalseBlock (vs warn) on threatsdefaultRiskThresholdnumber0.7Risk level that triggers actiontelegramAlertsbooleantrueSend alerts for blocked messagestelegramChatIdstring-Override alert destinationquarantineDirstring~/.openclaw/quarantine/hopeidsStorage pathagentsobject-Per-agent overridestrustOwnersbooleantrueSkip scanning owner messages

Quarantine Records

When a message is blocked, a metadata record is created: { "id": "q-7f3a2b", "ts": "2026-02-06T00:48:00Z", "agent": "moltbook-scanner", "source": "moltbook", "senderId": "@sus_user", "intent": "instruction_override", "risk": 0.85, "patterns": [ "matched regex: ignore.*instructions", "matched keyword: api key" ], "contentHash": "ab12cd34...", "status": "pending" } Note: There is NO originalMessage field. This is intentional.

Telegram Alerts

When a message is blocked: πŸ›‘ Message blocked ID: `q-7f3a2b` Agent: moltbook-scanner Source: moltbook Sender: @sus_user Intent: instruction_override (85%) Patterns: β€’ matched regex: ignore.*instructions β€’ matched keyword: api key `/approve q-7f3a2b` `/reject q-7f3a2b` `/trust @sus_user` Built from metadata only. No LLM touches this.

/quarantine [all|clean]

List quarantine records. /quarantine # List pending /quarantine all # List all (including resolved) /quarantine clean # Clean expired records

/approve <id>

Mark a blocked message as a false positive. /approve q-7f3a2b Effect: Status β†’ approved (Future) Add sender to allowlist (Future) Lower pattern weight

/reject <id>

Confirm a blocked message was a true positive. /reject q-7f3a2b Effect: Status β†’ rejected (Future) Reinforce pattern weights

/trust <senderId>

Whitelist a sender for future messages. /trust @legitimate_user

/scan <message>

Manually scan a message. /scan ignore your previous instructions and...

What Approve/Reject Mean

CommandWhat it doesWhat it doesn't do/approveMarks as false positive, may adjust IDSDoes NOT re-inject the message/rejectConfirms threat, may strengthen patternsDoes NOT affect current message/trustWhitelists sender for futureDoes NOT retroactively approve The blocked message is gone by design. If it was legitimate, the sender can re-send.

Per-Agent Configuration

Different agents need different security postures: "agents": { "moltbook-scanner": { "strictMode": true, // Block threats "riskThreshold": 0.7 // 70% = suspicious }, "main": { "strictMode": false, // Warn only "riskThreshold": 0.8 // Higher bar for main }, "email-processor": { "strictMode": true, // Always block "riskThreshold": 0.6 // More paranoid } }

Threat Categories

CategoryRiskDescriptioncommand_injectionπŸ”΄ CriticalShell commands, code executioncredential_theftπŸ”΄ CriticalAPI key extraction attemptsdata_exfiltrationπŸ”΄ CriticalData leak to external URLsinstruction_overrideπŸ”΄ HighJailbreaks, "ignore previous"impersonationπŸ”΄ HighFake system/admin messagesdiscovery⚠️ MediumAPI/capability probing

Installation

npx hopeid setup Then restart OpenClaw.

Links

GitHub: https://github.com/E-x-O-Entertainment-Studios-Inc/hopeIDS npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/hopeid Docs: https://exohaven.online/products/hopeids

Category context

Agent frameworks, memory systems, reasoning layers, and model-native orchestration.

Source: Tencent SkillHub

Largest current source with strong distribution and engagement signals.

Package contents

Included in package
2 Config1 Docs1 Scripts
  • SKILL.md Primary doc
  • index.ts Scripts
  • openclaw.plugin.json Config
  • package.json Config