Requirements
- Target platform
- OpenClaw
- Install method
- Manual import
- Extraction
- Extract archive
- Prerequisites
- OpenClaw
- Primary doc
- SKILL.md
A security layer plugin for OpenClaw that intercepts dangerous tool calls (exec, write, edit) through two-tier regex blacklist rules and LLM-based intent ver...
A security layer plugin for OpenClaw that intercepts dangerous tool calls (exec, write, edit) through two-tier regex blacklist rules and LLM-based intent ver...
Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.
I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete.
I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run.
The missing safety layer for AI agents.
OpenClaw gives agents direct access to shell, files, email, browser, and more. 99% of that is harmless. Guardian catches the 1% that isn't โ without slowing down the rest.
Tool Call โ Blacklist Matcher (regex rules, 0ms) โ No match โ Pass instantly (99% of calls) Warning hit โ 1 LLM vote ("did the user ask for this?") Critical hit โ 3 LLM votes (all must confirm user intent)
LevelLLM VotesLatencyExamplesNo match0~0msReading files, git, normal opsWarning1~1-2srm -rf /tmp/cache, chmod 777, sudo aptCritical3 (unanimous)~2-4srm -rf ~/, mkfs, dd of=/dev/, shutdown
Only three tool types are inspected: exec โ command string matched against exec blacklist write / edit โ file path canonicalized and matched against path blacklist Everything else passes through instantly
When a blacklist rule matches, Guardian asks a lightweight LLM: "Did the user explicitly request this?" It reads recent conversation context to prevent false positives. Warning: 1 LLM call. Confirmed โ proceed. Critical: 3 parallel LLM calls. All 3 must confirm. Any "no" โ block. Auto-discovers a cheap/fast model from your existing OpenClaw provider config (prefers Haiku). No separate API key needed.
Critical + LLM down โ blocked (fail-safe) Warning + LLM down โ asks user for manual confirmation
rm -rf on system paths (excludes /tmp/ and workspace) mkfs, dd to block devices, redirects to /dev/sd* Writes to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers shutdown, reboot, disable SSH Bypass: eval, absolute-path rm, interpreter-based (python -c, node -e) Pipe attacks: curl | sh, wget | bash, base64 -d | sh Chain attacks: download + chmod +x + execute
rm -rf on safe paths, sudo, chmod 777, chown root Package install/remove, service management Crontab mods, SSH/SCP, Docker ops, kill/killall
Critical: system auth files, SSH keys, systemd units Warning: dotfiles, /etc/ configs, .env files, authorized_keys
Every blacklist hit logged to ~/.openclaw/guardian-audit.jsonl with SHA-256 hash chain โ tamper-evident, each entry covers full content + previous hash.
openclaw plugins install openclaw-guardian Or manually: cd ~/.openclaw/workspace git clone https://github.com/fatcatMaoFei/openclaw-guardian.git
Scenario% of OpsExtra CostNo match~99%0Warning~0.5-1%~500 tokensCritical<0.5%~1500 tokens Prefers cheap models (Haiku, GPT-4o-mini, Gemini Flash).
extensions/guardian/ โโโ index.ts # Entry โ registers before_tool_call hook โโโ src/ โ โโโ blacklist.ts # Two-tier regex rules (critical/warning) โ โโโ llm-voter.ts # LLM intent verification โ โโโ audit-log.ts # SHA-256 hash-chain audit logger โโโ test/ โ โโโ blacklist.test.ts # Blacklist rule tests โโโ openclaw.plugin.json # Plugin manifest โโโ default-policies.json # Enable/disable toggle
MIT
Identity, auth, scanning, governance, audit, and operational guardrails.
Largest current source with strong distribution and engagement signals.