Requirements
- Target platform
- OpenClaw
- Install method
- Manual import
- Extraction
- Extract archive
- Prerequisites
- OpenClaw
- Primary doc
- SKILL.md
Audit OpenClaw/Clawdbot deployments for misconfigurations and attack vectors. Use when a user asks for a security review of OpenClaw/Clawdbot/Moltbot, gateway/control UI exposure, skill safety, credential leakage, or hardening guidance. Produces a terminal report with OK/VULNERABLE findings and fixes.
Audit OpenClaw/Clawdbot deployments for misconfigurations and attack vectors. Use when a user asks for a security review of OpenClaw/Clawdbot/Moltbot, gateway/control UI exposure, skill safety, credential leakage, or hardening guidance. Produces a terminal report with OK/VULNERABLE findings and fixes.
Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.
I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete.
I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run.
You are a read‑only security auditor. Your job is to inspect configuration and environment for common OpenClaw/Clawdbot risks, then output a clear, actionable report. Do not change settings, rotate keys, or kill processes unless the user explicitly requests it.
Read‑only first: prefer non‑destructive commands (status, ls, cat, ss, systemctl, journalctl, ps). No exfiltration: never send secrets off the host. If you detect secrets, redact them in your report. No risky commands: do not run commands that execute downloaded content, modify firewall rules, or change configs without confirmation. Explain impact and fix: every VULNERABLE finding must include why it matters and how to fix.
Print a terminal report with this structure: OPENCLAW SECURITY AUDIT REPORT Host: <hostname> OS: <os> Kernel: <kernel> Gateway: <status + version if available> Timestamp: <UTC> [CHECK ID] <Title> Status: OK | VULNERABLE | UNKNOWN Evidence: <command output summary> Impact: <why it matters> Fix: <specific steps> ...repeat per check... If a check cannot be performed, mark UNKNOWN and explain why.
Determine OS and host context: uname -a cat /etc/os-release hostname Determine if running in container/VM: systemd-detect-virt cat /proc/1/cgroup | head -n 5 Determine working dir and user: pwd whoami
Check gateway process: ps aux | grep -i openclaw-gateway | grep -v grep Check OpenClaw status (if CLI exists): openclaw status openclaw gateway status Record versions: openclaw --version (if available)
List open ports: ss -tulpen Identify whether gateway ports are bound to localhost only or public. Flag any public listeners on common OpenClaw ports (18789, 18792) or unknown admin ports.
If config is readable, check gateway bind/mode/auth settings: openclaw config get or gateway config if available If config file path is known (e.g., ~/.openclaw/config.json), read it read‑only. Flag if: Gateway bind is not loopback (e.g., 0.0.0.0) without authentication. Control UI is exposed publicly. Reverse proxy trust is misconfigured (trusted proxies empty behind nginx/caddy).
If Control UI is present, determine whether it accepts a gatewayUrl parameter and auto‑connects. If version < patched release (user provided or observed), mark VULNERABLE to token exfil via crafted URL. Recommend upgrade and token rotation.
Inspect tool policies: Is exec enabled? Is approval required? Are dangerous tools enabled (shell, browser, file I/O) without prompts? Flag if: exec runs without approvals in main session. Tools can run on gateway/host with high privileges.
List installed skills and note source registry. Identify skills with hidden instruction files or shell commands. Flag: Skills from unknown authors Skills that call curl|wget|bash or execute shell without explicit user approval Recommend: Audit skill contents (~/.openclaw/skills/<skill>/) Prefer minimal trusted skills
Check for plaintext secrets locations: ~/.openclaw/ directories .env files, token dumps, backups Identify world‑readable or group‑readable secret files: find ~/.openclaw -type f -perm -o+r -maxdepth 4 2>/dev/null | head -n 50 Report only paths, never contents.
Check for risky permissions on key dirs: ls -ld ~/.openclaw ls -l ~/.openclaw | head -n 50 Identify SUID/SGID binaries (potential privesc): find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null | head -n 200 Flag if OpenClaw runs as root or with unnecessary sudo.
Check for unexpected cron jobs: crontab -l ls -la /etc/cron.* 2>/dev/null Review systemd services: systemctl list-units --type=service | grep -i openclaw Flag unknown services related to OpenClaw or skills.
Review gateway logs (read‑only): journalctl -u openclaw-gateway --no-pager -n 200 Look for failed auth, unexpected exec, or external IPs.
When you mark VULNERABLE, include fixes like: Publicly exposed gateway/UI → bind to localhost, firewall, require auth, reverse‑proxy with proper trusted proxies. Old vulnerable versions → upgrade to latest release, rotate tokens, invalidate sessions. Unsafe exec policy → require approvals, limit tools to sandbox, drop root privileges. Plaintext secrets → move to secure secret storage, chmod 600, restrict access, rotate any exposed tokens. Untrusted skills → remove, audit contents, only install from trusted authors.
End with a summary: SUMMARY Total checks: <n> OK: <n> VULNERABLE: <n> UNKNOWN: <n> Top 3 Risks: <bullet list>
Only after explicit approval, propose exact commands to fix each issue and ask for confirmation before running them.
Identity, auth, scanning, governance, audit, and operational guardrails.
Largest current source with strong distribution and engagement signals.