Requirements
- Target platform
- OpenClaw
- Install method
- Manual import
- Extraction
- Extract archive
- Prerequisites
- OpenClaw
- Primary doc
- SKILL.md
Enforce safe secret handling by collecting secrets through one-time HTTPS forms, storing them in pass via scripts/vault.sh, and executing tools with environm...
Enforce safe secret handling by collecting secrets through one-time HTTPS forms, storing them in pass via scripts/vault.sh, and executing tools with environm...
Hand the extracted package to your coding agent with a concrete install brief instead of figuring it out manually.
I downloaded a skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder and install it by following the included instructions. Tell me what you changed and call out any manual steps you could not complete.
I downloaded an updated skill package from Yavira. Read SKILL.md from the extracted folder, compare it with my current installation, and upgrade it while preserving any custom configuration unless the package docs explicitly say otherwise. Summarize what changed and any follow-up checks I should run.
Run this workflow whenever credentials are needed.
Follow references/SETUP.md before first use.
Before first LAN-mode intake, verify both files exist: ~/.passwordstore-broker/totp.secret ~/.passwordstore-broker/setup_completed_at.txt If missing, run scripts/setup_totp_enrollment.py and send: QR image at qr_png_path (preferred) fallback otpauth_url Record and trust setup_completed_at as the initial enrollment timestamp. Never reveal or retransmit the totp.secret value after initial enrollment under any circumstances. Do not rotate totp.secret. User has to do it manually if compromised. Rotation is not to be done by the agent.
Goal: ensure required secrets exist in local vault without exposing values in chat. Map auth requirements to secret-name -> ENV_VAR. Check whether each secret exists: scripts/vault.sh exists <secret-name> If missing, collect via one-time HTTPS intake: Local mode (default): scripts/get_password_from_user.py --secretname <secret-name> --port <port> LAN mode (when user asks for phone/private-network flow): scripts/get_password_from_user.py --secretname <secret-name> --port <port> --access lan Send generated intake URL to user. In LAN mode, instruct user to submit both fields in the form: secret value current authenticator code If intake fails or times out, retry with a new port. Exit criteria: Required secret paths exist in vault.
Goal: execute authenticated commands without exposing secret values. Prefer injector wrapper: scripts/run_with_secret.sh --secret <secret-name> --env <ENV_VAR> -- <command> [args...] Fallback one-liner: <ENV_VAR>="$(scripts/vault.sh get <secret-name>)" <command> [args...] Never print env dumps (env, printenv, set) in secret-bearing runs. Exit criteria: Authenticated command succeeds without secret leakage.
Goal: manage lifecycle safely. Put/update: scripts/vault.sh put <secret-name> Get (only when necessary): scripts/vault.sh get <secret-name> Exists: scripts/vault.sh exists <secret-name> List: scripts/vault.sh ls Remove: scripts/vault.sh rm <secret-name> Naming policy: Use stable scoped keys like github/token, openai/prod/api_key, aws/staging/access_key_id. Rotation policy: Default to replacing value under the same key. Use versioned keys only when user explicitly asks.
Never ask users to paste raw secrets into chat. Never echo secret values back to user. Never store secrets in repo files, commit messages, issue comments, or transcripts. Never expose intake over public interfaces or tunnels. LAN mode must rely on runtime private-network autodetection and webform TOTP validation.
Ensure TOTP enrollment exists (via setup preflight) before first LAN use. For each missing secret, run intake in local or LAN mode based on user intent. Execute tools via run_with_secret.sh. Rotate/remove secrets via vault.sh as requested.
Identity, auth, scanning, governance, audit, and operational guardrails.
Largest current source with strong distribution and engagement signals.